Shaked and Sutton (1982) and Gelman and Salop (1983) are best remembered for their neat conclusions: a limited quality or limited capacity is an effective tool to relax competition and facilitate entry in a market. We aim at comparing the respective merits of these two strategic commitments. We claim that capacity limitation is more effective than quality reduction, mainly because it acts directly upon the incumbent to reduce his aggressiveness in the final price competition whereas quality tools works indirectly trough consumer's willingness to pay.
Introduction
The fact that many industries feature one or few dominant firms and a fringe of small competitors has been nicely formalized by Gelman and Salop (1983) : in order to relax price competition and make entry profitable, an entrant can use a carrot and stick strategy. She voluntarily limits her production capacity to guarantee a large residual demand for the incumbent; yet, she names a low price that would prove dear to undercut. In their discussion of possible means to achieve this credible commitment, the authors claim that "producing a product with limited consumer appeal is analogous to capacity limitation".
It is indeed true that a similar strategic commitment is at work in the models of quality differentiation of Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979) and Shaked and Sutton (1982) : the entrant optimally chooses a low quality and offers a substantial rebate on her product in order to induce the incumbent not to fight too aggressively in prices. The incumbent therefore prefers to accomodate entry although its is always possible for him to exclude the entrant from the market.
In this note we mix the two previous strand of literature by considering a game of entry where the entrant is allowed to choose the quality of its product and its production capacity. The question we raise is the following: does the entrant use product differentiation and capacity precommitment simultaneously? We show in Theorem 1 that under efficient rationing, quality imitation coupled with an optimal capacity limitation is more effective than having a large production capacity and a low quality. Even if differentiation occurs, it is limited. Furthermore, the product of quality by capacity remains equal to the optimal capacity limitation.
The model
We follow Mussa and Rosen (1978) and (Tirole, 1988, sec. 2 .1) to model quality differentiation. A consumer with personal characteristic x is willing to pay xs for one unit of quality s and nothing more for additional units. He maximizes surplus and when indifferent between two products, select his purchase randomly. Types are uniformly distributed in [0; 1].
In agreement with most observed real cases, the incumbent is committed to the best available quality (normalized to unity) before entrants get an opportunity to pick their own, without however the ability to leapfrog him. We also assume that quality is not costly for firms 1 and that the marginal cost of production is nil (up to the capacity limit and equal to +∞ otherwise). These considerations lead us to study the following stage game 2 G:
• At t = 0, an incumbent i enters the market and selects the top quality s i = 1 and a large capacity k i = 1.
• At t = 1, an entrant e selects its quality s e = s ≤ 1 and capacity k e = k ≤ 1.
• At t = 2, firms compete simultaneously in prices.
We denote G(s, k) the pricing game occurring at the last stage. Our solution concept for the game G is Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium. Observe that two classes of price subgames might be generated by choices made at t = 1: either k = 1 and we face a standard game of vertical differentiation or k < 1 and we face a Bertrand-Edgeworth game with (possibly) product differentiation.
Consumers make their choice at the last stage by comparing the respective surpluses they derive when buying from the incumbent, the entrant or nobody i.e., x − p i , xs − p e and 0. In the absence of differentiation (s = 1), demands are as in the standard Bertrand game. In the presence of differentiation (s < 1), it is a straightforward exercice to show that demands are given by
(1) 1 An upper bound on the admissible qualities is required to ensure that firms' payoffs are bounded.
2 Recall that Gelman and Salop (1983) 's model is of the Stackelberg type where the entrant commits to capacity and price before the incumbent is able to respond in price.
Firms' profits in the pricing game are
When capacity is not an issue (k = 1) and products are differentiated (s < 1), Choi and Shin (1992) show that firms best replies are continuous and given by: 
These best replies are displayed on Figure 1 and the equilibrium is summarized in Lemma 1 below. Lemma 1 For s < 1, the game G(s, 1) has a unique pure strategy equilibrium:
Plugging (6) into (3), we obtain the entrant's first stage payoff as a function of his quality: Π e = s(1−s) (4−s) 2 . Straightforward computations yield the following corollary.
Corollary 1 The optimal quality for the entrant in the class of pricing games
, yielding the profit π * e = 1 48
.
Notice that the pricing game G(1, 1) is a classical Bertrand game with linear
In case of a price tie, demand is shared equally by the two firms.
Rationing and Sales
Whenever the entrant has unlimited capacity (k = 1), sales are equal to demand as characterized by equations (1) and (2). However, if the entrant has build a limited capacity (k < 1), there are prices leading up to more demand than can be served i.e., D e (p e , p i ) > k. In such cases, some consumers will be rationed and possibly report their purchase on the incumbent. In order to characterize firms' sales in that situation, we assume efficient rationing: rationed consumers are those exhibiting the lowest willingness to pay for the good. The limited k units sold by the entrant will be contested by potential buyers, 3 the price p e paid for them will rise to the level ρ e where the excess demand vanishes. In the case of duopoly competition, we solve
while in the case of monopoly,
ever
Now, using (1), we obtain the residual demand addressed to the incumbent firm as
The expressions for the sales functions are therefore:
where branch (11:c) is void if p i < 1 − ks.
Price Best Responses
Whenever k < 1, the analysis of G(k, s) must take into account the possibility that firms sales are respectively given by equations (12:b) and (11:d) where the entrant's capacity is binding and the incumbent recovers all rationed consumers. It is immediate to see that the best she can do is to sell her capacity at the highest price, which is ρ e . On the other hand, whenever the incumbent plays along 
On Figure 2 we illustrate the case k > 1 2 (in the other case, the third branch of (13) , p e = π i for p e , we obtain:p
which is represented on Figure 2 
Last, to know which case applies, we solvep e =p e to obtain:
Depending on the value of the capacity k, we might therefore obtain two different shapes for the best response of the incumbent firm in the pricing game: The critical valuesp e andp e therefore identify the price level at which firm i is indifferent between naming the security pricep i = 1−ks 2 or naming a lower price which ensures a larger market share. The resulting discontinuity is likely to destroy the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium.
Price Equilibrium
We analyze the Nash equilibria for each price subgame G(s, k). Let us first deal with imitation whereby the entrant chooses top quality (s = 1). In this case, the vertical differentiation model degenerates into a Bertrand-Edgeworth competition for an homogenous product. Levitan and Shubik (1972) analyze this game under the efficient rationing hypothesis and derive the following result whose proof is given in Appendix A. 4 Notice that applying Gelman and Salop (1983) 's Stackelberg sequentiality to the current demand yields exactly the same optimal capacity (cf. Appendix B). 
Lemma 2 G(1, k) has a unique price equilibrium in which the

4−s is a pure strategy equilibrium of G(s, k) whenever k ≥ g (s).
Proof The candidate equilibrium is (p * i , p * i ) characterized in Lemma 1 (cf. eq.
(6) and Figure 1 ). The price p * i remains a best response to p * e only if p * e ≥p e ; straightforward computations yield the condition k ≥ g (s) and since g (s) > h(s), we check thatp e was indeed the benchmark to use. ■ Whenever k < g (s), a pure strategy equilibrium fails to exist. For intermediate capacities, it is easy to identify a particular equilibrium in which the incumbent randomizes over two atoms while the entrant plays the pure strategyp e . However, there also exists a domain of small capacities where even this equilibrium fails to exist. When this is the case, both firms use non-degenerate mixed strategy in equilibrium. The equilibrium strategy used by firm j = i , e in equilibrium of 4 Since h(1) = 1, the relevant benchmark isp e . 5 Indeed, g (s) > h(s) ⇔ 16s 2 (1 − s) + s 4 (3 + s) > 0 which is always true (over the relevant domain , the monopoly price because at any p i > Proof We may check by algebra that when k < g (s), it is true that 2k(1 − s) < (1 − s) , then the previous argument does not apply because the incumbent's sales might vary. However, if this case occurs then the entrant's demand, when facing F i , is always of the duopolistic kind without capacity constraint, hence his best reply is the pure strategy φ e computed at the average of p i . Since the pure strategy equilibrium does not exists over the present domain, the incumbent must be playing a mixed strategy and the only candidate when the entrant plays a pure strategy involves playing the security pricep i , a contradiction with p
We have thus shown that p
and since the equilibrium payoff can be computed at any price in the support of F i , we have π i (p The second claim is a simple consequence of the fact that the equilibrium payoff can be computed at any price in the support of F e , hence 
